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PAY AS RISK REGULATION 
ANDREW C.W. LUND∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 How do we prevent financial institutions from taking excessive risk when the public fisc 
serves as creditor? This is one of the central questions left over after the recent financial 
crisis and, for the past five years, there has been no shortage of proposed answers. Two of 
the more popular candidates for ex ante regulation—proprietary trading restrictions and 
enhanced capital requirements—are on their way to being enacted in one form or another, 
albeit with some controversy over their cost and ultimate efficacy. Meanwhile, a third, more 
indirect approach has sprouted in the pages of law and finance journals under which bank 
managers’ compensation packages would be adjusted to include bank debt, thereby altering 
their risk-taking incentives. This approach has even been put in place at certain non-U.S. 
financial institutions. This Article offers a critical appraisal of regulating bank risk-taking 
through executive pay design. “Risk regulation by pay” is less likely to ameliorate risk-
taking than more direct approaches because bank managers with career concerns will con-
tinue to face significant incentives to take on high levels of firm risk. Moreover, regulating 
by pay is an inapt solution where marginal monitoring costs for creditors are relatively low 
as is the case with bank monitoring. Instead, the case for regulating bank risk through pay 
redesign must be grounded in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs in a system of 
prudential regulation. It is hard, however, to see how compromised regulators faced with 
broad discretion would be much better at implementing a pay regulation regime. Thus, the 
most effective version of risk regulation by pay will be afflicted with largely the same im-
plementation problems as traditional, direct risk regulation. Even worse, the very fact of 
risk regulation by pay, no matter how modestly proposed, makes it more likely that tradi-
tional direct monitoring will further atrophy, leaving the government-as-creditor worse off 
than before. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 As the explicit or implicit insurer of banks and other systematical-
ly important financial institutions, the federal government has an 
obvious interest in constraining the risks taken by those firms. That 
interest may trade off against the benefits of increased liquidity pro-
vided by banks’ willingness to take risks. But, at least since the fi-
nancial crisis made the cost of these guaranties more salient, the 
question of whether to reduce bank risk has given way to the question 
of how to reduce bank risk. Some proposals—most notably the 
Volcker Rule banning proprietary trading1 and enhanced capital re-
quirements2—would alter traditional prudential monitoring mecha-
nisms, resulting in increased direct regulation of banks.3  
 Parallel to these, another set of proposals would indirectly regu-
late bank risk by requiring bank managers’ compensation packages 
to include some level of unsecured bank debt.4 The basic notion un-
derlying these proposals is that introducing more debt into bank 
managers’ portfolios would make those managers more sensitive to 
their firms’ insolvency risks and therefore less likely to fall prey to 
the moral hazard unique to banks. These proposals have been round-
ly applauded in the press5 and appear to have gained some purchase 
 1. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see also Press Release, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing Volcker Rule (Dec. 10, 
2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm.   
 2. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 
425-28 (2012) (describing the Basel agreements and recent calls for higher capital require-
ments). 
 3. Regulatory responses to excessive risk-taking are not limited to banks, as narrow-
ly understood. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act permits designation of non-bank entities 
as systemically important financial institutions that would subject such entities to pruden-
tial regulation traditionally reserved for banks. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012)). While there are 
important differences, this Article groups banks and SIFIs together. This is consistent with 
the approach taken in the proposals that are the subject of this extended critique.  
 4. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247 (2010); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1821 (2012); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, HARV. BUS. REV., June 
2012, at 107; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compen-
sation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2011); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive 
Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible 
Equity-Based Pay (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Center for Law & Economic Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1633906; see also PATRICK BOLTON, HAMID MEHRAN & JOEL SHAPIRO, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, STAFF REPORT NO. 456, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK 
TAKING 1 (2010) (suggesting tying bank CEO pay to the bank’s credit default swap spread). 
Much of the theoretical groundwork for the debt compensation proposals was laid prior to 
the crisis in a paper by Professors Edmans and Liu. See Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside 
Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75 (2011) (first drafted and posted to SSRN in 2005). 
 5. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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among bank regulators6 and even bankers themselves.7 This Article 
offers a skeptical appraisal of this move to regulate bank risk-taking 
by altering pay design. 
 Holding all things equal, altered compensation incentives should 
lead bank managers to take on less risk in order to maximize the 
value of their portfolio that would then include debt instruments sen-
sitive to such risk. But, to this point, the debt compensation pro-
posals do not fully grapple with the countervailing incentives created 
by bank executives’ career concerns. As the managerial labor market 
has become tougher on CEOs, advocates of increased debt compensa-
tion have a higher hurdle to clear in order to demonstrate that add-
ing some amount of debt will counteract both the incentives provided 
by mangers’ existing equity holdings and those arising out of simple 
career concerns.  
 Resolving this question largely turns on empirical questions about 
the managerial labor market discussed below.8 However, regulating 
risk-related moral hazard at banks through a compensation contract 
seems somewhat misspecified even in theory. Bonding through incen-
tive pay is traditionally seen as a second-best solution, primarily use-
ful in cases where a principal’s monitoring costs are high.9 Although 
it is commonly assumed that monitoring costs are high for regulators 
with respect to bank risk,10 it is less clear whether those costs are 
substantially higher than those of bank CEOs upon whose manageri-
al acumen the pay proposals rely. The regulatory experience during 
the financial crisis was not characterized by particularly high levels 
 6. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. To my knowledge, these papers have 
been subjected to extended criticism only twice. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The 
False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and De-
ferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53 (2012); Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, 
Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159 (2010); see also Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Pol-
sky, The Diminishing Returns of Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677, 708-11 (2012) (noting that the Tung and Bebchuk/Spamann 
proposals are subject to criticism related to a broader argument about the efficacy of incen-
tive pay); infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (describing Jeff Gordon’s briefer criti-
cism of the Bebchuk/Spamann proposal). 
 7. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part III, for more on those empirics as well as studies analyzing the 
effect of inside debt on firm risk-taking. 
 9. See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A 
Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 32, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=794806 (“Obviously, if shareholders (or the board of directors) 
could directly observe the firm’s opportunities and the executives’ actions and know be-
forehand which actions would maximize shareholder wealth, no incentives (including equi-
ty incentives) would be necessary . . . . To motivate the executive to take actions that are in 
the best interests of the shareholders, compensation risk is imposed on the executive by 
linking the executive’s wealth to firm performance (that is, the second-best contract is 
used).”).  
 10. See infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. 
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of regulator ignorance or bank obfuscation.11 Moreover, and as others 
have pointed out,12 there may be relatively simple ways to effectively 
lower the costs of monitoring bank risk. Finally, bank managers’ 
monitoring costs may be surprisingly high in modern financial firms. 
 The more powerful case for regulating risk by pay is grounded, 
rather, in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs.13 Regulators 
may not have the will to regulate banks as a normal creditor might 
monitor another firm. Given recent events, it is indeed hard to argue 
that enforcement incentives are ideal. Regulation by pay solves the 
problem by relying on managers’ self-interest to reduce risk. Howev-
er, regulation by pay implemented well in advance of any particular 
bank risk-taking will likely be subject to greater regulator agency 
costs than other forms of ex ante regulation that occur closer to the 
point of risk-taking. So, in order to be preferable with respect to regu-
lator agency costs, a debt compensation proposal would have to limit 
regulatory discretion over its implementation. However, the discre-
tion-reducing debt compensation proposals are exactly the ones that 
are least likely to achieve socially optimal bank manager incentives 
because there is no reason to think that, say, aping a bank’s capital 
structure sets an efficient, risk-reducing contract. Thus, the effec-
tiveness of debt compensation as a solution to the moral hazard at 
banks will be at least uncertain prior to adoption.  
 Nevertheless, it may be that paying with debt would simply be 
incremental to the array of regulatory tools available. If so, there 
might be little harm in experimenting with debt compensation incen-
tives, even if they ultimately turn out to be relatively insignificant. 
However, there is reason to worry that the introduction of debt com-
pensation into the regulatory toolbox might cause regulators to relax 
prudential monitoring mechanisms. In fact, most of the debt compen-
sation proposals specifically make this point about substituting indi-
rect regulation for direct regulation.14 Even more troublingly, mis-
takenly evaluating debt compensation’s effectiveness at deterring 
risk would be consistent with the historical overestimation of pay 
structure’s impact on the incentives of corporate managers.  
 Part II introduces the oft-noted problem of moral hazard in bank-
ing given a world of government guaranties. It goes on to briefly dis-
cuss the traditional methods of prudential bank monitoring, many of 
which appear to have failed in the months and years preceding the 
 11. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. 
 12. E.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293 
(2012). 
 13. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1015-22 (2012). 
 14. See infra Part II. 
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recent crisis. Finally, it lays out the collection of proposals for indi-
rect bank regulation through debt compensation that have been gen-
erated over the past four years. 
 Part III calls for some skepticism regarding the ability to produce 
significant incentive effects by tinkering with bank managers’ pay. It 
describes the new range of incentives facing bank managers, includ-
ing evidence of a CEO’s increasingly fragile grasp on his or her posi-
tion. The implicit equity performance conditions in the executive’s 
employment arrangement—one must famously keep dancing while 
the music plays15—are apt to counter any risk-dampening effect of 
debt compensation in the majority of cases. 
 Part IV offers a separate argument against using a bonding mech-
anism like debt compensation to fix firm risk-taking. It shows how 
the conditions necessary for choosing (1) bonding via compensation 
contract over (2) direct prudential monitoring are not obviously met 
in the case of governmental regulation of banks. To the extent regu-
lation by pay is preferable to traditional, prudential monitoring, it 
must be because of high regulator agency costs—that is to say, regu-
lators may not have incentives to forcefully use the information they 
obtain. However, regulator agency costs are likely to prove as prob-
lematic, if not more so, for regulation by pay as they do for traditional 
prudential regulation. 
 Part V suggests that the move to regulating bank risk through 
pay may turn out to be more than just unhelpful. It may actually   
displace prudential monitoring to a degree, as admitted by even      
the most sober proponents. Apart from those admissions, Part V     
describes how regulators and scholars have often overestimated     
the level of incentive effects occasioned by tinkering with pay. Given 
that history, there is reason to think they may do so again in this 
new context, perversely leading to a more relaxed monitoring regime 
than before.     
II.   THE DEBT COMPENSATION PROPOSALS 
 It is widely believed that banks took on high levels of risk in the 
lead-up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009.16 As discussed below, 
 15. See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-
Outs, FIN. TIMES (July 9, 2007), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2sZ3TBW8d (“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things 
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. 
We’re still dancing.”). 
 16. Among those who share this view, there is some disagreement over what counts as 
“excessive” risk. See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 204. For instance, Bebchuk 
and Spamann define it as negative-value “bets” that are nevertheless privately optimal. 
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 255. This may be too strict a definition of “excessive” 
from the point of view of creditors, who may even object to positive value bets that are par-
ticularly volatile.  
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banks are subject to a particular sort of moral hazard occasioned by 
the socialization of losses through federal guaranties. Much thought 
has gone into solving the problem of bank moral hazard, culminating 
in a series of proposals to adjust bank managers’ pay by adding more 
bank debt to their portfolio. Those proposals are detailed below, 
alongside the handful of voices to the contrary that have heretofore 
been raised. 
A.   Bank Moral Hazard and Direct Regulatory Responses 
 Bank managers had substantial reasons to prefer excessive risk 
and volatility during the run-up before 2007.17 Those managers were 
appointed by boards answerable to shareholders and, in fact, were 
significant shareholders themselves by virtue of historical equity 
compensation arrangements. Whether through labor market disci-
pline, compensation-related bonding, or a combination thereof, man-
agers internalized equity preference for increased risk.18 Pre-crisis 
banks, in this regard, were not very different from firms in other in-
dustries, with both shifting the preferences of risk-averse managers 
toward those of risk-seeking, diversified shareholders.19  
 Although bank managers were exposed to the same sort of incen-
tive shifting as those in other industries, banks were uniquely likely 
to take on higher levels of risk. Non-banks are already less highly 
levered than banks, lowering the applicable risk baseline.20 More im-
portantly, non-banks are generally subject to cross-monitoring by 
creditors that often constrains risk-taking.21 Banks have creditors 
too—for instance, depositors at commercial banks—but bank credi-
tors often have little reason to incur monitoring costs because the 
bank debts are subject to implicit or explicit government guaran-
ties.22 The government, in effect, stands in as the relevant creditor to 
banks, but government regulators appear to have performed their 
 17. Simple human error also played a part in the excessive risk-taking that helped 
cause the recent financial crisis. See Ing-Haw Cheng, Harrison Hong, & Jose A. 
Scheinkman, Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 2010). 
 18. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1206-07. 
 19. Id. at 1214-18.  
 20. See, e.g., Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 168 (“All banks engage in some 
form of the ‘carry trade’ that involves borrowing money in order to acquire assets that earn 
a positive ‘spread’—or the difference between the cost of short term capital and the profit 
generated by longer term lending. It is generally understood that the carry trade rewards 
high-risk decisions because leverage amplifies the expected return for any investment.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 21. Tung, supra note 4, at 1206. 
 22. See id. 
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monitoring task poorly during the pre-crisis period.23 The contours of 
that failure are discussed in greater detail in Part III below, but 
commentators have observed that the government failed to pump the 
brakes as bank manager risk preferences were shifted toward those 
of their shareholders.24 
 Since the crisis, various legislative and regulatory attempts have 
been made to dampen risk-taking at banks. Consistent with histori-
cal prudential monitoring, many of these approaches involve direct 
oversight of banks’ behavior. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act       
included a non-specific mandate to ban proprietary trading by 
banks.25 Recently that mandate has been codified in a final version of 
the Volcker Rule.26 Elsewhere, regulators and academics are pursu-
ing enhanced capital requirements that would create a cushion         
in case of failure so as to reduce the risk of bank insolvency.27 Finally 
and more modestly, some have suggested ways to simply strengthen, 
without fundamentally changing, the existing bank examiner        
monitoring regime.28  
 23. See generally Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The 
Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327 (2009) (detailing the 
various missteps of regulators during the period leading up to the financial crisis). 
 24. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 53-54 (stating that a contributing factor to the 
financial crisis was the alignment of managers and shareholders through incentive-based 
pay); Tung, supra note 4, at 1222-23 (noting that prior to the financial crisis, bankers’ in-
centives were similar to “the standard shareholder-wealth-maximizing approach to com-
pensation used in unregulated industries” and bank regulators failed to guard against risk 
taking); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive 
Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 436 (2010) (“After years of much rhetoric but little action, it ap-
pears that the federal government may be poised to take meaningful steps to increase ex-
ecutive compensation regulation.”).  
 25. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 
(2012)). The statute leaves the contours of the rule to the rulemaking process, which is 
susceptible to a scathing public choice critique. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe 
the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53 (2013). More-
over, a Volcker Rule that is able to usefully reduce bank risk-taking must distinguish be-
tween true proprietary trading and difficult-to-cabin alternatives like hedging and market-
making. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 16 (2011). 
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 1851. 
 27. See, e.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 2, at 425-26 (discussing Basel III’s increase in 
bank capital requirements); Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in 
the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive 57 (Rock 
Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 161, 2013), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349739 (calling for even higher 
capital requirements than Basel III). 
 28. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13 (calling for an incentive pay regime for 
bank examiners); M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An 
Auction Approach to Regulatory Assignments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1895 (2013) (calling for bank 
examiners to select the firms they will examine); M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, 
Why Bank Regulation Failed . . . and Will Probably Continue to Fail (2012) (unpublished 
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 More indirect routes to reduce risk have also been suggested. The 
Dodd-Frank Act mandated that financial firms’ boards install a risk 
management committee comprised of independent directors.29 The 
committee would theoretically do some of the work of prudential 
monitoring traditionally performed by regulators.30 Alternatively, an 
enhanced disclosure regime might permit market participants to 
more effectively price bank risk.31 Those market participants, primar-
ily subordinated debtholders,32 might helpfully complement tradi-
tional regulation under such a regime.  
B.   Paying with Debt 
 The most prominent proposals for indirect regulation, however, 
seek to shape bank risk-taking by altering bank manager compensa-
tion. Under these proposals, bank managers supplied with newly cal-
ibrated portfolio incentives would themselves serve as complemen-
tary bank monitors.33 The idea is an extension of the basic incentive 
pay framework that has come to dominate public company govern-
ance over the past three decades.34 Unlike the present situation with 
banks, governance activists’ primary concern was that entrenched 
managers, having significant firm-specific human capital invested in 
their jobs, took too little risk, causing valuable projects to be avoided 
and firm valuations to suffer.35 Performance-based pay serves as a 
bonding device in situations where it is relatively difficult to observe 
manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing to strengthen the regulatory veto held by bank 
examiners by expanding precommitment devices of bank examiners); see also Saule T. 
Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 63, 81-82 (2012) (collecting examples of “solutions to the problem of systemic 
risk caused by increasing complexity of financial products and markets”).  
 29. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(h), 124 Stat. at 1429-30 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(h)). 
The requirement is for all public bank holding companies and public non-bank financial 
holding companies supervised by the Federal Reserve with assets of ten billion dollars or 
greater. Id. 
 30. See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk 
Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 106-07 (2011). There are 
substantial arguments against relying on outside directors to shape firm performance in 
this context. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Do Out-
side Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial 
Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 31. See Bartlett, supra note 12. 
 32. Id. at 305.  
 33. Whether the managers would be complementary or substitute regulators is dis-
cussed infra Part IV. 
 34. For another recent summary of executive-compensation-as-governance over the 
years, see Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 56-59.  
 35. See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, J. APPLIED 
CORP. FIN., Spring 2003, at 21, 29 (“One of the most commonly alleged benefits of options is 
that they help overcome managers’ natural aversion to risk.”). 
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managers’ behavior,36 where shareholders do not have the ability or 
interest to monitor ex ante,37 or where executive decisions affect firm 
percentage returns rather than dollar returns.38 Determining the ef-
fect on firm behavior attributable to this sort of compensation tinker-
ing has proven to be an econometrically difficult trick,39 and there are 
long-running debates over whether observed compensation struc-
tures reflect arm’s-length bargaining or managerial power.40 Never-
theless, it is popularly believed that the introduction of heavy levels 
of performance-based pay caused increased risk-taking economy-wide 
over recent decades.41  
 In the light of that success, some commentators turned to mana-
gerial pay design in their attempt to adjust (now in a downward di-
rection) risk-taking at banks post-crisis. In fact, even prior to the fi-
nancial crisis and apart from banking, scholars were beginning to 
model the use of debt compensation’s relation to firm risk-taking.42  
In its most modest form, such an approach might call for a reduction 
in equity compensation for managers43 and/or longer holding periods 
for equity stakes.44 More ambitiously, however, some proposals     
 36. For more on the question of observability, see Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and 
Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979) (introducing his “informativeness” principle). 
 37. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2485, 2521 (O. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999) (“In general, increasing 
shareholder wealth involves investing in positive net present value projects, increasing 
profits on existing capital, and diverting resources from negative net present value pro-
jects. There is a wide array of actions that affect shareholder value, including defining the 
business strategy, choosing between debt and equity financing, making dividend and re-
purchase decisions, identifying acquisition and divestiture targets, selecting industries and 
markets to enter or exit, allocating capital across business units, setting budgets for devel-
oping new products and businesses, hiring productive (and firing unproductive) subordi-
nates, and designing, implementing, and maintaining the nexus of implicit and explicit 
contracts that defines the organization. Expanding the set of potential actions that affect 
shareholder value diminishes the role for ‘informativeness’ and increases the benefit of 
tying pay to the principal’s objective rather than to measures of inputs.”). 
 38. See George P. Baker & Brian J. Hall, CEO Incentives and Firm Size, 22 J. LABOR 
ECON. 767, 778 (2004). 
 39. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 705 & n.121 (noting that endogeneity poses 
particularly serious problems for drawing causal inferences from compensation data). 
 40. See id. at 711-15 (summarizing the debate). For a taste of the main points of disa-
greement, compare LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (suggesting managerial power 
drives compensation choices), with John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Ineffi-
cient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (questioning the Bebchuk 
and Fried account). 
 41. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 47 (2010) (“The structure of executive compensation, however, can affect 
the risk of systemically important financial institutions.”); Tung supra note 4, at 1206. 
 42. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 4; Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bank-
ruptcy: Why CEOs Should be Compensated with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007).  
 43. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 54 & n.3. 
 44. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive 
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suggest altering the pay structure of bank managers so as to include 
significant levels of bank debt.45 This debt would bond managers       
to the bank’s creditors to one extent or another as opposed to its     
equityholders.  
 The inclusion of bank debt in pay packages would be new but not 
entirely without precedent. Most bank managers already hold some 
sort of inside debt. Many are entitled to unfunded future deferred 
compensation and pension payouts that effectively function as debt 
claims on the firm.46 In a more mundane sense, future compensation 
streams are subject to firm credit risk—exactly the sort of debt-like 
interest that led to the push for enhanced equity pay in the first 
place. The proposals discussed below, however, go beyond these exist-
ing practices and call for the inclusion of actual or phantom debt secu-
rities to be issued by banks or their parent bank holding companies.  
 1.   The Proposals 
 At about the same time, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann, on 
the one hand, and Fred Tung, on the other, proposed adding debt to 
bankers’ pay packages in order to ameliorate the moral hazard prob-
lem at banks. Bebchuk and Spamann suggested a number of possible 
structures,47 but the one that has received the most attention is their 
“pay-by-the-slice approach” that would tie bank manager compensa-
tion to the entire set of securities in the bank holding company’s capi-
tal structure. Tung’s approach was similar with two notable excep-
tions that seem to mark improvements. First, Tung would use subor-
dinated bank-level debt as opposed to senior bank holding company 
debt in order to cancel out potential noise created by non-bank seg-
Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 361 
(2009). 
 45. See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4; Tung, supra note 4.  
 46. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 
823 (2005); Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and 
Its Role in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551 (2007); but see Robert J. Jackson, Jr. 
& Colleen Honigsberg, The Hidden Nature of Executive Retirement Pay, 100 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014) (finding that much of executives’ inside debt is sensitive to share price 
fluctuations and, in any event, is payable immediately upon departure from the firm).  
 47. Their alternatives include: (1) tying compensation to the value of the bank holding 
company’s common stock and preferred stock issued to the government as part of the 2008 
bailouts; (2) the pay-by-the-slice approach adjusted for bailout disbursements; (3) tying 
compensation “to the aggregate value of the bank [holding company]’s common shares, 
preferred shares, and bonds at the specified time minus the expected value of future gov-
ernment payments as proxied by the product of (i) the implied probability of default in-
ferred from the price of credit default swaps at the specified time and (ii) the value of the 
bank’s deposits at that time[;]” and (4) tying bonus compensation to “measures such as 
earnings before any payments made to bondholders.” Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, 
at 283-85. 
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ments within the holding company structure.48 Second, Tung would 
not necessarily mimic banks’ capital structures on the ground that 
individual managers’ risk preferences are likely heterogeneous. Ac-
cordingly, there is no reason to assume that mapping capital struc-
ture onto pay structure would appropriately align any particular 
manager’s incentives.49 Instead, boards should attempt to calibrate 
an optimal basket of securities for any particular banker’s pay based 
on specific bank and executive characteristics.50 This idiosyncrasy 
limits the ability to directly mandate pay rules or guidelines as would 
be available under a pay-by-the-slice approach.51 However, as an ex-
ample of its potential workability, Tung suggested that deposit in-
surance premiums might be tailored to account for any compensation 
structure adopted by the bank.52   
 In a similar vein, Wulf Kaal has recently suggested adding an un-
specified amount of contingent convertible bonds to bank executives’ 
pay packages.53 This debt would function similarly to the debt de-
scribed by Bebchuk, Spamann, and Tung, but would convert to equity 
upon the triggering of some objective threshold of credit deteriora-
tion.54 For signaling purposes, Kaal would set this triggering thresh-
old lower than that used in convertible debt sold to the market.55 
 Jeff Gordon also suggests adding a debt-like pay element for 
bankers.56 In a sense, however, Gordon’s suggestion is the opposite of 
Kaal’s. Rather than initially paying via a mix of debt and equity se-
curities, Gordon would allow banks to continue paying managers 
 48. Tung, supra note 4, at 1231-35, 1236 & n.165. Additionally, market discipline 
might be more likely for bank-level subordinated debt because of the greater likelihood for 
periodic issuance of additional debt securities. Id. at 1231-34. 
 49. Id. at 1248. 
 50. Id. For banks, the designer would consider leverage, capital structure, investment 
opportunities, ownership structure, default risk, and certain effects of the relevant bank 
holding structure. Id. at 1248 & n.210 (collecting authorities). For managers, the designer 
would consider their portfolios, including existing inside debt (generally pensions and de-
ferred compensation). Id. at 1248. 
 51. This is likely a strong point in favor of Bebchuk & Spamann’s approach. See infra 
Part IV.B. 
 52. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1249-50. 
 53. See Kaal, supra note 4, at 1854. 
 54. Id. at 1855-59. 
 55. See id. at 1869-72. 
 56. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 11. Importantly, Gordon departs from the Bebchuk-
Spamann and Tung approaches by assuming that shareholders at systemically important 
financial institutions may internalize the costs of excessive risk-taking to a degree not 
otherwise anticipated. This is so, argues Gordon, because institutional shareholders are 
not able to diversify away systemic risk that excessive bank-specific risk might pose. Id. at 
2-4. The problem of excessive risk-taking at banks, therefore, is not so much the traditional 
equity/debt divide writ large as much as it is a reflection of particular incentives faced by 
bank managers who are not efficiently diversified, having much of their wealth invested in 
a particular bank’s equity securities. Id. 
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with equity. That equity, however, would be subject to conversion 
into subordinated debt (with a haircut) upon certain triggers—
regulatory downgrades, drops in key accounting metrics, and, per-
haps, drops in share prices.57 This approach clearly provides stronger 
incentives to avoid excessive risk—at least as insolvency becomes 
more likely—than Bebchuk and Spamann’s (and certainly Kaal’s) 
proposal, since a manager’s entire portfolio would be conditionally 
debt-like.58  
 Finally, Sallie Krawcheck, formerly of Bank of America and 
Citigroup, penned a Harvard Business Review op-ed in which she 
joined the call for reconfiguring banker pay to include debt.59 While 
noncommittal about the necessary combination of equity and debt in 
an optimal package, Krawcheck noted that “the most logical end 
point would be a compensation mix that mirrors the bank’s capital 
structure.”60 Though the details are not spelled out, her approach is 
reminiscent of Bebchuk and Spamann’s pay-by-the-slice approach. 
Coming from a former “insider,” Krawcheck’s article has been cele-
brated as something of a breakthrough in bank governance. Her 
compensation solution was positively noted by various press outlets,61 
and a New York Times columnist wrote that the debt compensation 
proposal was his “favorite” solution in Krawcheck’s article.62 
 57. Id. at 11. 
 58. Tung’s proposal, modest as it is regarding the appropriate mix of debt and equity 
at any given firm, could be structured so as to be debt-heavy and thus similar to Gordon’s 
proposal, though the magnitude of the haircut in implementing Gordon’s proposal would 
determine if even a debt-heavy version of Tung’s approach could match the risk-aversion-
inducing effects of Gordon’s. Gordon’s proposal also solves a potential problem of bank 
managers with high equity positions failing to recapitalize banks when necessary. See id. 
at 12 (noting that the proposal solves the “Fuld problem,” named for Richard Fuld, former 
CEO of Lehman Brothers). 
 59. Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 108-09. Krawcheck also summarized the main points 
in an entry for the Huffington Post. See Sallie Krawcheck, How to Make Banks Less Risky, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sallie-
krawcheck/wall-street-reform-banks_b_1590794.html. Soon after publication, Krawcheck’s 
name was floated as a possible SEC commissioner. See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, As 
Official Drops Out, S.E.C. Race Shifts, DEALBOOK – N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:54 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/as-miller-drops-out-race-for-s-e-c-chief-shifts/?_r=0. 
 60. Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 109. 
 61. See Shanny Basar, How to Fix the Banking System, FIN. NEWS (May 24, 2012), 
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-05-24/sallie-krawcheck-fixes-banks; In the Har-
vard Business Review, Sallie Krawcheck ’87 Calls for Banking Reform, MOREHEAD-CAIN 
(June 1, 2012), http://moreheadcain.org/about/ news/sallie_krawcheck_hbr_bank_reform; 
Alan Kline, Krawcheck: Banks Have a Governance Problem, AM. BANKER (May 24, 2012, 
1:40 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/people/sallie-krawcheck-harvard-business-
review-1049619-1.html; Adam O’Daniel, Ex-Bank of America Exec Sallie Krawcheck Shares 
Advice for Banks, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (May 23, 2012, 2:49 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/ 
charlotte/blog/bank_notes/2012/05/ex-bank-of-america-exec-sallie.html.  
 62. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Simplicity Solution, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A23. 
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 Actual implementation of such debt compensation proposals has 
been sporadic to this point. Some British firms—Royal Bank of Scot-
land and Lloyds in particular—have included subordinated debt in 
lieu of cash bonuses.63 However, these alterations appear to have 
been driven at least as much by balance sheet considerations as in-
centive effects. Barclays has also introduced contingent debt-like in-
struments into pay packages.64 In the United States, Kenneth Fein-
berg, serving as Pay Czar for the U.S. Treasury Department, forced 
AIG to use “Long-term Performance Units” (“LTPUs”) when compen-
sating executives in 2010.65 The LTPUs were to be paid in cash on a 
future date at a value keyed off of both AIG subordinated debentures 
and common stock, at a four-to-one ratio.66 Although the Pay Czar 
has since faded from memory, the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council retains the mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to regulate 
compensation at banks and systemically important financial institu-
tions to reduce excessive risk.67 In a 2011 proposed rule, U.S. regula-
tors went so far as to cite approvingly academic work suggesting that 
inside debt might mitigate risk-taking.68 Thus, the debt compensa-
tion proposals described above may begin to play an even more signifi-
cant role going forward.  
 2.   Earlier Critiques  
 The response to these debt compensation proposals in law and fi-
nance journals has been relatively muted. Some of the criticism simp-
ly reflects internecine disagreements, which are not fatal to the gen-
eral project. As noted, Tung criticized the pay-by-the-slice approach 
for its assumption that parity between a bank’s capital structure and 
an executive’s portfolio is the optimal solution for risk purposes.69 
Such problems, though, are relatively fixable through tweaking—in 
 63. See George Parker et al., Lloyds Shares Volatile Despite PM’s Support, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3cfa60ca-0c20-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac.html 
(Lloyds for 2008 bonuses); Jill Treanor, RBS Bows to Government Demand to Slash Bonus-
es, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/17/rbs-bonus-
payments (Royal Bank of Scotland for 2008 bonuses). 
 64. See BARCLAYS, DELIVERING ON OUR PROMISES: BARCLAYS PLC ANNUAL REPORT 
172-73 (2010), available at http://reports.barclays.com/ar10/files/Annual_Report_2010.pdf. 
 65. AIG, INC., LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE UNITS PLAN (2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/5272/000095012310054330/y84839exv10w1.htm. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b)(1)-(2) (2012).  
 68. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 21,199 n.123 
(proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at scattered parts of 12 C.F.R. and 17 C.F.R. pt. 
248). 
 69. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
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this example, Tung would substitute a more tailored level of subordi-
nated bank debt in the banker’s pay package.70  
 Less easily resolved are two sets of somewhat interrelated cri-
tiques, one from Jeffrey Gordon,71 and the other from Kelli Alces and 
Brian Galle.72 Gordon’s argument is made in the context of his al-
ready discussed proposal for paying via convertible equity and is rel-
atively brief. Referencing the Bebchuk and Spamann approach,        
he makes three points. First, paying by the slice will require an ini-
tial determination as to what counts in terms of the firm’s capital 
structure that a banker’s pay package is supposed to mimic.73 Assum-
ing these rules are generalizable, the pay-by-the-slice approach 
might provide incentives for managers to game capital structure de-
cisions just as they may have gamed ratings agency rules to achieve 
helpful outcomes for their structured finance products.74 Second, val-
uation is likely to be difficult for the more exotic bank securities that 
one often finds in such firm’s capital structures. Many of these secu-
rities will not trade in thick markets, and consequently, there may  
be new pressure placed on accounting measures, potentially giving 
rise to a separate set of issues.75 Finally, Gordon suggests that even 
relatively thick debt markets may not reliably reflect bank risk, par-
ticularly given the current state of implicit government “too-big-to-
fail” guaranties.76  
 Gordon’s criticisms are essentially practical, revolving around the 
proposals’ workability. However, there may be reasons to think the 
proposals are not as difficult to implement as suggested. For in-
stance, Tung’s proposal to simply include an unspecified amount of 
bank subordinated debt does not rest on an interpretation of a bank 
holding company’s capital structure and avoids at least the first part 
of Gordon’s critique. Moreover, to the extent that a pay-by-the-slice 
approach would rely on such an interpretation, it is not obvious why 
rules of thumb could not be developed. Of course, such rules might 
 70. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
 72. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 65-71. Karl Okamoto and Douglas Edwards 
also criticize the proposals. See Okamoto & Edwards, supra note 6, at 182-205. They con-
tend that forced deleveraging in an executive’s portfolio may in fact cause those executives 
to seek out risk in order to at least potentially achieve payouts consistent with the recent 
past. Id. at 192-93. They also argue that given a relatively high investment by the execu-
tive in the firm, it does not matter whether the investment comes in the form or debt or 
equity because high risk presents the unattractive possibility of total loss in either case. Id. 
at 193-96.  
 73. Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
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serve as guideposts to inefficient restructurings,77 though those fears 
would appear to require significant mispricing of bank holding com-
pany securities in markets in order to present significant arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 It might also be true that valuation problems would follow the in-
clusion of exotic debt securities in pay packages, but Gordon himself 
notes that derivative markets and new accounting conventions would 
do some of the work, and Tung provides evidence that at least the 
market for subordinated bank debt functions reasonably well.78 Fi-
nally, Gordon himself offers something of a solution to any insensitiv-
ity to bank credit risk—commit to excluding debt compensation from 
any future bailouts.79 In sum, Gordon raises points that are im-
portant and, for Bebchuk and Spamann in particular, difficult to 
handle, but his argument need not be entirely persuasive to debt 
compensation’s proponents.   
 Alces and Galle offer a more sustained critique of debt compensa-
tion. Their argument is complex but essentially makes three inde-
pendent claims.80 First, Alces and Galle posit that any excessive risk-
taking observed at banks is largely driven by previous compensation 
choices, namely the introduction of massive amounts of equity pay 
into managers’ contracts.81 It would be simpler, they say, to just re-
duce this type of pay rather than to add a countervailing, risk-
reducing incentive through bank debt.82 Debt compensation’s propo-
nents are entitled to respond, however, that there is surprisingly lit-
 77. See id. These restructurings would function as a form of regulatory arbitrage 
known to be endemic to financial regulation. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 75, 77 (2013) (“[I]t is unrealistic to believe that complete ex ante regulation could 
survive the political opposition of the financial services industry.”). 
 78. Tung, supra note 4, at 1230-31. 
 79. It is not clear that this outcome could not be achievable even ex post at the time of 
bailout or even later. See, e.g., Gene Bloch, Treasury Pressure Leads to AIG Scaling Back 
Bonuses, CNN (Mar. 15, 2009, 1:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/14/aig.bonuses/ 
index.html?eref=ib_us (noting how AIG reduced post-bailout retention payments to em-
ployees after receiving pressure from the Treasury Department).  
 80. Alces and Galle make other points as well. They argue that debt compensation 
creates cross-monitoring costs for creditors beyond the class of creditors whose securities 
are paid to managers. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 67-68. The basic idea is that creditors 
that are either senior to or junior to the managers will have different risk preferences as 
credit risk increases. This is certainly true, but it is not clear why those costs would be 
greater than the monitoring costs those creditors currently face. Moreover, and as Alces 
and Galle note, the pay-by-the-slice approach largely obviates this problem. Id. at 67-68. 
Furthermore, Alces and Galle note that debt compensation must be managed to account for 
the dynamism of a firm’s capital structure. Id. at 71-72. As they point out, however, re-
balancing is available subject to transaction costs. Id. Alces and Galle correctly suggest 
these transaction costs are incrementally harmful to the firm, though it is hard to see why 
these costs should be particularly large. 
 81. See id. at 57-59, 64. 
 82. See id. at 65-66; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 709 n.138. 
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tle evidence that equity-laden compensation structures actually pro-
duced the sort of risk-taking seen at banks prior to the crisis.83 Risk-
taking appears to have been driven by bank governance features, in-
cluding, but not limited to, equity pay, meaning that simply removing 
equity pay might not solve the problem of moral hazard. In a world of 
multiple incentives to take high risk, adding debt compensation 
might still serve as a counterbalance, depending upon the relative 
strength of those prior incentives and the new debt.84   
 Second, Alces and Galle puzzle over a conundrum at the heart of 
the structuring of debt compensation. The new instruments must be 
junior enough to actually make credit risk a significant concern for 
executives85 but not too junior so as to chance effectively transform-
ing the security into equity.86 The potential of bailouts obviously ag-
gravates the former concern, and distinguishing management’s debt 
from subordinated creditors’ would seem to be a solution. However, 
Alces and Galle note that subordinating management’s debt claims to 
the most junior (yet bailed-out) debt claims would make the claims 
“too junior to align managers’ interests perfectly with any class of 
creditors”; that is, they would be too equity-like.87 The point here is 
certainly true, but its practical import is uncertain. The key is the 
requirement of something like perfect alignment.88 In this case, the 
two debt liquidation preferences—the most junior but potentially 
bailed out claims and management’s ostensibly unprotected claims—
would share virtually the same level of seniority. Depending on the 
magnitude of the debt securities held by the manager, it might be 
difficult for him to confidently predict his bank’s assets in a future 
insolvent state with enough precision to draw the line between his 
claims and those of the incrementally more senior creditor. Although 
the bank manager would not be exactly in the shoes of a hypothe-
sized unprotected junior creditor, he would be pretty close, and one 
might reasonably expect the manager’s decisionmaking to be in-
 83. The most prominent study concerning the matter showed no significant associa-
tion between pre-crisis equity incentives and firm performance. See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & 
René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (Ohio State Univ. Fisher Coll.   
of Bus., Working Paper No. 2009-03-013, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/          
abstract=1439859. 
 84. See infra Part III, discussing the strength of the managerial labor market in par-
ticular. 
 85. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 69. 
 86. Id. at 69-70. 
 87. Id. at 69. 
 88. See id. (“In order to have the effects its proponents recommend, inside debt com-
pensation cannot be either too senior or too junior; rather, it must be ‘just right.’ ”); see also 
Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 77-78, 89 (noting that under certain conditions, the opti-
mal debt-equity ratio may have an “equity bias” or a “debt bias,” but a “debt bias is some-
times optimal”). 
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formed by the interests of that hypothetical creditor for all intents 
and purposes.  
 Finally and most persuasively, Alces and Galle argue that bank 
managers will struggle to calibrate their behavior in the face of an 
increasingly complex decision calculus brought on by the addition of 
debt compensation.89 Their discussion is rich, but, in short, they sug-
gest that bank managers might behave randomly in response to addi-
tional debt incentives, relying on rules of thumb that may not be 
linked to value-maximizing choices.90 Alces and Galle anticipate 
pushback on this point. First, we have no basis for determining the 
level of pay complexity at which additional complexity becomes use-
less or even counterproductive.91 Perhaps we have already reached 
that point with complicated equity pay arrangements, meaning that 
equity compensation might not be increasing risk-taking the way 
many people believe it does. Alternatively, we may be far away from 
the threshold, allowing room for debt proposals to prove effective. 
Second, Alces and Galle note that executives might be better posi-
tioned to deal with complexity than most, as they are necessarily so-
phisticated consumers of financial products with greater incentives to 
understand the consequences of their behavior.92 Finally, it may be 
enough from the perspective of the proposals surveyed that new debt 
incentives simply move the needle in the right direction for risk-
taking.93 Thus, while Alces and Galle may be right that the inclusion 
of debt securities would overwhelm the cognitive capacity of bank 
managers, the point need not be fatal to the debt compensation project. 
 Each of these critiques of debt compensation is certainly plausible 
and even persuasive. However, none of them are strong enough, even 
taken in the aggregate, to require the conclusion that tinkering with 
bank manager compensation is a bad idea. Parts III and IV attempt 
to add to the case against regulating banks via pay.  
III.   COMPETING INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND THE INEFFECTIVENESS 
OF DEBT COMPENSATION 
 Bank managers face pressures and consequent incentives in an 
enormous number of domains, making compensation structure just 
one of a multitude of potential governance levers. To the extent those 
other levers run opposite of new compensation incentives, the latter 
 89. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 76-79. 
 90. Id. at 77-78. 
 91. Id. at 79. 
 92. Id. at 79-80. 
 93. Alces and Galle do recognize this point, see id. at 82, but contend that increased 
complexity might be debilitating in addition to merely confusing. Id. (“Using debt instru-
ments may reduce executive sensitivity to all forms of incentives.”).  
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may be relatively ineffective in shaping firm behavior. In fact, as   
discussed below, debt-like instruments may be uniquely ill-suited    
to stand out among contradictory demands on bank managers’       
decisionmaking.  
 Within the corporate governance and finance communities, it has 
been generally understood for decades that compensation structure 
might complement other disciplinary devices in shaping managers’ 
behavior.94 This has led to higher levels of equity pay, which, as not-
ed, lines up on the other side of the bank risk-taking problem.95 Pay 
structure was thought to be particularly effective where it was rela-
tively difficult to observe managers’ behavior and where potential 
monitors did not have the skill or motivation to do so.96 That these 
conditions might not hold for bank risk-taking is discussed in Part IV 
below, but at the outset it is understandable that those seeking to 
change bank decisionmaking would look to compensation structure 
as a solution.97  
 For many reasons, bank CEOs face a different sort of world than 
the one posited by the original advocates of pay-for-performance. Al-
most all of these changes have made it harder for the CEO to exert 
unilateral control over the bank and instead nudge or even force de-
cisions tending toward short-term share price maximization.98 Insti-
tutional shareholders hold a greater share of the public equity mar-
ket than ever before.99 Hedge funds and pension funds have taken the 
lead in a new brand of shareholder activism and have drafted other-
wise sleepy monitors like mutual funds to their side in battles with 
 94. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How 
Much You Pay, but How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 139-40. For a primer on 
the theoretical case for incentive pay, see Murphy, supra note 37, at 2519-28. 
 95. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
 97. The remainder of this Part assumes that relevant bank shareholders uniformly 
prefer high levels of firm risk, consistent with the literature for firms generally. See, e.g., 
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 255-56; Tung, supra note 4, at 1206. It is therefore 
not responsive to Gordon’s claim that diversified bank shareholders largely internalize the 
costs of systemic risk that individual banks might impose. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
It is difficult to tell exactly how sensitive such shareholders are to systemic risk and 
whether well-diversified shareholders or less-diversified shareholders will prevail at any 
given firm. In any event, to the extent that shareholders seek to reduce risk at a bank, it is 
unclear, given the subsequent discussion, why compensation need be one of the governance 
levers utilized.   
 98. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 691-709 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, 
Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1039-40, 1051 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, 
Embattled CEOs]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 895-97 (2002).  
 99. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 998; see also Paul Rose, 
Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010). 
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management.100 Proxy advisory firms have increased their influence, 
generally lowering monitoring costs.101 Furthermore, boards have be-
come more active at enforcing share price maximization and other 
shareholder-friendly decision rules at the same time that sharehold-
ers have increased their monitoring activities.102 
 Nowhere have these changes manifested themselves more than in 
an increasingly volatile managerial labor market at public compa-
nies, including large banks. The managerial labor market’s ability to 
discipline, long viewed with skepticism,103 has become far more ro-
bust. One influential study found that the average tenure of a CEO 
had shrunk in the years after 1998 to less than six years.104 The in-
creased turnover is not randomly distributed, as getting fired is be-
coming more and more closely tied to share price performance.105 The 
correlation between poor performance and turnover is particularly 
strong in cases where firm performance falters relative to its peers.106 
 100. Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 998-1004. For more on the 
interplay between activist investors and mutual and pension fund voting, see Ronald J. 
Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and 
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013).  
 101. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 98, at 1005-07. For an example of 
the way in which proxy advisory firms wield influence over governance questions, see An-
drew C.W. Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KY. L.J. 119, 121, 126-27 (2010). 
 102. See Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 693-94. 
 103. See, e.g., Core et al., supra note 9, at 30 & 45 n.2 (ignoring, for incentive purposes, 
the threat of termination but noting that “[t]his assumption likely does not hold for CEOs 
with large turnover probabilities”). Research performed at the end of the last century large-
ly confirmed this view. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 2547 (finding a 7.9% probability of 
departure for young CEOs at average-performing firms increasing only to an 8.5% proba-
bility if the young CEO’s firm realizes returns 30% below industry average); Kevin J. Mur-
phy & Ján Zábojník, Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs 28-30 (Apr. 2007) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=984376 (finding that “departure probabilities for CEOs realizing returns 30% below the 
industry average were increased by 0.4% in the 1970s, 0.7% in the 1980s, and 0.4% in the 
1990s” and concluding “that the turnover-performance relation . . . has fallen since the 
1980s”). 
 104. Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?     
2 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/    
steven.kaplan/research/km.pdf. This conclusion is consistent with the results of a recent 
study finding that, as of 2010, the typical CEO of an S&P 500 firm had served for only 6.6 
years. Joann S. Lublin, CEO Tenure, Stock Gains Often Go Hand-in-Hand, WALL ST. J. 
(July 6, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870390000 
4575325172681419254. In addition, the Wall Street Journal study found that (excluding 
founders) only twenty-eight CEOs of the 500 S&P firms had served for more than fifteen 
years, suggesting that the archetypal entrenched CEO has become a myth. Id. 
 105. See Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evalua-
tion 20-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12068, 2006), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12068.pdf (finding turnover strongly correlated with stock 
returns consisting of firm-specific performance and industry-wide performance). The Wall 
Street Journal study, see Lublin, supra note 104, similarly found that, of the twenty-eight 
longest-serving CEOs, twenty-five had led firms whose share price performance had beaten 
the overall S&P index over the term of their tenure.  
 106. Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 105, at 20-24. 
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Thus the threat of dismissal exists for all CEOs at firms where be-
low-median industry-adjusted performance is a real possibility.107 
While there may remain a threshold level of underperformance nec-
essary to trigger labor market discipline,108 it is harder to imagine 
CEOs with career concerns exploiting any slack.109  
 In addition, there is reason to think the labor market should be 
particularly effective with respect to banks. First, banks and other 
financial institutions are relatively homogenous, making firm-to-firm 
comparisons a function of more objective measures for external moni-
tors.110 Second, the homogeneity reduces the value of firm-specific 
capital, permitting lower cost turnover.111 If comparisons and transi-
tions are easier at banks, we should expect to see more labor market 
discipline at financial institutions. 
 Just as these disciplinary mechanisms reduce the marginal im-
pact of pay structures designed to align managers’ interests with eq-
uity, they similarly limit the incentive effect of those designed to 
align managers’ interests with creditors. Whatever is done with pay 
packages, equityholders’ interests will continue to drive bank man-
ager discipline in the labor market. Assuming shareholder preference 
for risk on the one hand and compensation incentives tilted heavily 
toward debt on the other, bank managers will face two conflicting 
imperatives—reduce risk and increase the value of the debt instru-
ments, or increase risk and save their jobs. When Citigroup’s Chuck 
Prince noted the need to continue “dancing until the music 
stopped”112—in other words, accumulating risk during the pre-crisis 
bubble—he was surely not only talking about the personal portfolio 
effects of doing so.   
 107. See id. For more on this data and its implications, see Lund & Polsky, supra note 
6, at 702-03. 
 108. See, e.g., Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 105, at 3 (citing research to the effect that 
CEO quality must fall below a threshold before a board will dismiss a manager). There 
may be other factors entering into the calculus as well. Coates and Kraakman, for example, 
demonstrate that CEO tenure has something of a term structure with respect to resigna-
tions and replacements via takeover (but not internal forced departures) for CEOs with low 
share holdings. According to this model, the CEOs are relatively insulated for the first 
three to four years of their tenure, followed by a period of increased turnover, culminating 
in a period of lower turnover (perhaps demonstrating a survival effect, managerial power, 
or both). See John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure, Performance and Turn-
over in S&P 500 Companies 15-17 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working 
Paper No. 191/2007, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=925532. 
 109. Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 703.  
 110. Renée Adams & Hamid Mehran, Is Corporate Governance Different for Bank Hold-
ing Companies?, 9 FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 123, 125 & 137 n.13.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See Nakamoto & Wighton, supra note 15. 
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 The case for debt compensation as a brake on risk-taking actually 
turns out to be less convincing than the case for equity compensation 
was as an accelerator for risk-taking. To see this, note the different 
portfolio incentives created by adding options versus adding debt. 
The level of debt compensation will have to be extraordinarily high to 
create reasonably powerful incentives. Debt’s limited upside makes it 
relatively expensive to use it to counterbalance pressures to maxim-
ize share price. Stock options are much cheaper incentive devices (in 
grant-date value terms) since their asymmetric upside payout might 
push a hesitant executive to take on outsize levels of risk for a chance 
at substantially increasing share price. With inside debt’s fixed pay-
out, however, the magnitude of inside debt holdings would have to be 
much larger to cause a manager to eschew normal career concerns in 
order to protect the debt portfolio’s value. 
 Nevertheless, there is some evidence marshaled in the debt com-
pensation proposals suggesting that it might have positive effects on 
firm risk-taking. For instance, some studies have found a correlation 
between large CEO pensions and less risk-taking.113 Along the same 
lines, studies have shown that debt and equity markets react to dis-
closure of CEO debt holdings, implying that those markets predict a 
change in firm behavior based on pay practices.114 As Alces and Galle 
note, however, endogeneity may be an issue, since risk-taking and 
pay design may be driven by CEO choices or firm culture.115 The en-
dogeneity explanation seems at the very least plausible given the ap-
parent weaknesses of debt compensation described above.116  
 This is all to say that paying with debt might have some effect on 
the behavior of banks run by managers with extremely short labor 
market horizons and exceptionally high levels of inside debt relative 
to their overall wealth. For managers with moderate or long labor 
market horizons and/or more varied portfolio holdings, however, we 
have no right to expect very much from the proposed tweaks to bank 
manager compensation.   
 113. E.g., Sundaram & Yermack, supra note 46, at 1554-55; see also Frederick Tung & 
Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3-4 
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-49, 2012) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1570161; but see Jackson & Honigs-
berg, supra note 46 (linking CEO pension value to share price). 
 114. E.g., Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt 
Incentives, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3813 (2011). 
 115. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 83; see also Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 
682-83.  
 116. In fact, Tung and Wang raise the endogeneity point explicitly, Tung & Wang, su-
pra note 113, at 25, and conclude they cannot “make strong causal inferences from the 
data.” Id. at 27.  
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IV.   DEBT COMPENSATION VERSUS PRUDENTIAL MONITORING 
 Aside from pay regulations’ diminished effect in a new managerial 
labor market, bank risk-taking may not be an obvious candidate for 
preferring indirect regulation to more direct prudential monitoring. 
Direct monitoring already exists through bank examiners and a sub-
stantial regulatory regime, meaning that marginal implementation 
costs of better direct monitoring are much smaller than they might 
be otherwise. Informational asymmetries, commonly named as the 
downfall of prudential monitoring, may be somewhat surmounta-
ble.117 Regulatory agency costs—the lack of monitoring will on the 
part of individual regulators—are real and problematic in the context 
of prudential bank monitoring. However, those costs attend to all ex 
ante bank regulation that grants broad discretion to regulators, in-
cluding a debt compensation regime.118     
A.   The Costs of Prudential Monitoring 
 Optimizing bank risk through pay design makes sense when mon-
itoring costs are high. In such situations, it is more efficient for the 
monitor (here, the government-as-creditor) to condition payments to 
the agent (here, bank managers) on some sort of performance meas-
ure than to incur those high costs of monitoring its behavior (here, 
risk-taking).119 This basic insight supports, for instance, the use of 
equity pay in an optimal contract between dispersed shareholders 
and managers of large, public companies. Those dispersed sharehold-
ers are unlikely to monitor if the costs are even marginally high be-
cause of well-known collective action problems.120 Worse yet, the costs 
to public company shareholders of monitoring project selection are 
high because of the open-ended nature of the equity contract and a 
lack of expertise. 
 On the contrary, where marginal monitoring costs are low, per-
formance-based pay is less necessary.121 For instance, in the case of 
firms in bankruptcy, creditor groups are already committed to invest-
 117. See infra notes 149, 177-78, 180 and accompanying text. 
 118. The problems with relying solely on ex ante bank regulation are discussed in 
Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 93-102. The authors discuss the unavoidability of 
accidents, problems of regulatory capture, and over-deterrence of risk-taking. The second of 
these is discussed in greater detail below.  
 119. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
 120. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 201-03 
(2002). 
 121. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too 
Low? A Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2010, at 5, 12 
(“To the extent that boards and shareholders can either directly monitor CEOs’ actions or 
use other governance mechanisms to indirectly reduce agency conflicts, strong perfor-
mance-based incentives will be less necessary.”). 
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ing high levels of monitoring resources, thereby obviating much of 
the need for performance-based pay.122 Because performance-based 
pay devices are most beneficial as monitoring costs increase, the ap-
propriateness of debt compensation for bank risk-taking necessarily 
turns on the magnitude of those monitoring costs.  
 1.   Collective Action Problems, Information Quality, and Expertise 
 In most respects, the marginal monitoring costs for prudential 
regulators are relatively low. The federal government faces no seri-
ous collective action problem because it is explicitly the creditor to all 
banks for federally insured deposits and implicitly the creditor for 
many bondholders and counterparties at too-big-to-fail banks.123 Fur-
thermore, the government should have relatively low marginal costs 
for gathering additional information going forward.124 For a long 
time, national banks, state banks, bank holding companies and other 
FDIC-insured institutions have been subject to review by bank exam-
iners employed by one regulatory body or another.125 Since Dodd-
Frank’s enactment, the FSOC may require similar examinations of 
systemically important non-bank financial firms by the Federal Re-
serve.126 These bank examiners are on site at banks on a regular ba-
sis reviewing bank assets and operations.127 Todd Henderson and 
Fred Tung, for instance, report that the equivalent of twenty exam-
iners were monitoring Washington Mutual for over 200 days annual-
ly during the 2003–2008 period.128 During such periods, bank exam-
iners have access to all aspects of the bank’s operations. Additionally, 
none of the post mortems from the financial crisis suggest that bank 
managers systematically misled regulators by withholding infor-
mation from them.129 
 Further, there may be relatively easy ways to enhance infor-
mation gathering by regulators. Robert Bartlett, discussing the con-
 122. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Response, The Problematic Case for Incentive Compen-
sation in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 88, 94-96 (2007); Robert K. Rasmus-
sen, Response, On the Scope of Managerial Discretion in Chapter 11, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 77, 77-78 (2007). 
 123. Individual regulators may face collective action problems as a part of a team, but 
this is a type of regulator agency cost discussed infra Part IV.A.2. 
 124. To be sure, the initial installation of bank examiners imposes serious costs. How-
ever, the existence of bank examiners is part of the baseline from which the debt compen-
sation proposals spring, and as such, those costs are not appropriately counted in this con-
text.  
 125. Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1016-21. 
 126. 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012). 
 127. For an overview of the role played by bank examiners, see generally Henderson & 
Tung, supra note 13, at 1016-21. 
 128. Id. at 1017. 
 129. See, e.g., id. at 1021-26. 
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text of increasing market-based monitoring of bank risk, suggests 
that disclosures adapted for easier credit modeling could be crafted 
for transmission to the relevant monitor.130 Bartlett points out that 
the granularity missing from such disclosure might pose problems,131 
but bank regulators would have the ability, post-disclosure, to delve 
into the details of a bank’s operations in ways that ordinary market 
participants would not. Furthermore, confidentiality concerns are 
much less serious in cases of monitoring by regulators than they are 
in cases of market monitoring.  
 Traditional critiques of prudential monitoring have also alluded to 
the lack of expertise on the part of regulators.132 The idea is that even 
if raw information about bank positions is made available to regula-
tors, bank examiners and their supervisors are hopelessly over-
matched by better-informed bank managers.133 Of course, we might 
expect bank managers to understand their firm’s risk more than 
bank examiners, but the degree of that difference is unclear. Hender-
son and Tung, for example, conclude their review of post-crisis sum-
maries of bank failures by noting that bank examiners were general-
ly aware of the problems at distressed institutions well before they 
became public and did not suffer a failure to understand what was 
happening.134 Moreover, as discussed above, there is no reason to 
think that new disclosure mandates could not be produced to further 
level the playing field between managers and regulators.135  
 Even taking some level of regulator ignorance for granted, bond-
ing managers to certain risk levels through debt compensation is only 
useful to the extent that managers are in a better position to under-
stand the risk. If regulatory ignorance is due to, say, the complexity 
of modern financial institutions, then relying on bank managers to 
self-discipline will not help matters if those managers are equally 
ignorant. Along these lines, some scholars have suggested that much 
of the excessive risk-taking that occurred at banks in the run-up to 
the financial crisis was caused by secondary managers at banks who 
were able to shape their trading decisions to take advantage of flaws 
in the Value at Risk (“VaR”) credit model.136 The supervisors of these 
 130. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 369-82.  
 131. Id. at 377-79. 
 132. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Review Essay, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of 
Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 
1463 (1993) (reviewing PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF 
MODERN WALL STREET (1992)). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1015. 
 135. See Bartlett, supra note 12, 369-82 (suggesting a disclosure regime to increase 
transparency). 
 136. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Second-
ary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 457, 460-61 (2009) (observing that VaR 
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middle-level managers relied on VaR models to evaluate their per-
formance without fully understanding what was missing from the 
model.137 To the extent that such information or expertise problems 
are either surmountable or equally experienced by bank managers, 
debt compensation proposals are bound to be less effective.   
 2.   Regulator Agency Costs 
 The failure of prudential monitoring is apt to be a story of the lack 
of monitoring will. Henderson and Tung make this point explicitly in 
their recent work.138 That recognition led them to suggest tinkering 
with regulator pay to encourage more forceful bank monitoring.139 
Alternatively, one could imagine relaxing the civil service protections 
afforded to bank regulators to give them greater career-oriented in-
centives to intervene. More to the point, comparing direct regulation 
(prudential monitoring) and indirect regulation (debt compensation) 
turns out to be a difficult empirical question reducible to the respec-
tive discounts imposed on the former for regulator agency costs and 
the latter for bank managers’ insensitivity to pay structure.140 This 
question might be less thorny than it immediately appears, however. 
If regulator agency costs would be roughly equivalent in a debt    
compensation regime, it ceases to be preferable to prudential moni-
toring on any count as even weak concerns about debt compensation’s 
effectiveness discussed in Part III would tend to dominate.141 That is, 
debt compensation proposals are unconvincing unless they are at 
least better at dealing with regulator agency costs than traditional 
prudential monitoring. 
B.   Regulator Agency Costs and Debt Compensation 
 Other than Jeffrey Gordon’s proposal, which suggests that share-
holders might voluntarily opt for risk-reducing compensation struc-
tures,142 all of the other debt compensation proposals heretofore dis-
cussed implicitly or explicitly rely on regulatory intervention to dis-
rupt the compensation status quo.143 The most draconian version of 
did not account for events with a de minimis chance of occurring even if the cost to the firm 
in the rare negative case would be catastrophic). 
 137. Id. at 461-64. 
 138. See generally Henderson & Tung, supra note 13. 
 139. Id. 
 140. The debt compensation proposals are unlikely to impose significantly higher com-
pensation costs on firms because the debt is unlikely to engender much of a risk premium 
required by managers. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 141. Alternatively, the equation might be solved by a reduction in regulator agency 
costs. See, e.g., Henderson & Tung, supra note 13, at 1031-41. 
 142. Gordon, supra note 4, at 13. 
 143. E.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 278-79; Tung, supra note 4, at 1247. 
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regulatory intervention might involve direct involvement of regula-
tors in structuring bank manager pay packages as seen post-crisis    
in the work of the Pay Czar.144 A more limited version would, for ex-
ample, call for softer third-party intervention by altering deposit   
insurance premiums to account for more or less risk-friendly pay 
structures.145 Obviously, a number of approaches that fall between 
these poles are available. In all cases, however, regulatory action will 
likely be required to set up a scheme for evaluating and enforcing            
pay norms. 
 The debt compensation proposals leave largely unaddressed this 
question: Why should we expect regulators to be more aggressive in 
forcing risk-reducing pay practices onto bank managers than they 
would be in their traditional role of monitoring bank risk-taking?146 
There is at least some reason to think that the problem of regulatory 
forbearance and/or capture might be more acute in the context of 
compensation setting. Stories abound of extraordinary industry 
pushback against regulatory incursions into pay setting.147 Generally, 
regulators have been loath to force firms to compensate executives in 
particular ways or at particular levels.148 Moreover, at the time when 
debt compensation approaches would have to be adopted, regulators 
might have little reason to think that any particular bank is actually 
taking on high levels of risk. Faced with no emergency to focus their 
 144. See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012) (mandating compensation restrictions on recipients of 
bailout funds). 
 145. Tung, supra note 4, at 1249-50. 
 146. Tung notes the problem. See id. at 1250 (“Relying on regulators to incorporate 
banker pay arrangements into their discretionary regulatory strategies carries certain 
risks, of course[,] . . . [including] the standard regulatory agency conflicts . . . .”).  
 147. For reaction to the government’s implementation of TARP see, for example, Eric 
C. Anderson, The TARP Travesty, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 10, 2009, 2:33 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-c-anderson/the-tarp-travesty_b_387504.html; Bank of 
America’s TARP Repayment: Ken’s Last Act, ECONOMIST (Dec. 3, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15020046; Rick Newman, Why Goldman Sachs Should 
Repay Its TARP Money, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2009/03/24/why-goldman-sachs-should-
return-its-tarp-money. For reaction to the government’s implementation of § 162(m) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, see, for example, JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RES. SERV., EMPLOYEE 
STOCK OPTIONS: TAX TREATMENT AND TAX ISSUES 9-10 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31458.pdf; Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regu-
lating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensa-
tion, 20 J. LAB. ECON. S138 (2002); Norman R. Augustine, Op-Ed., Raise the Price of Fame, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2005, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/ 
06/16/opinion/16augustine.html?r=0; Editorial, Chairman Frank, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 5, 2007, 
at 6, available at http://www.nysun.com/editorials/chairman-frank/46160. 
 148. See, e.g., Andrew C.W. Lund, Tax’s Triviality as a Pay-Reforming Device, 57 VILL. 
L. REV. 571, 585-86 (2012); David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 
93 B.U. L. REV. 325, 376-84 (2013). 
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attention, regulators might reasonably be expected to be more lax in 
their oversight of bank behavior.149  
 The case that regulation by pay might be less susceptible to regu-
lator agency costs is likely to depend instead on the specificity and 
rigidity of the pay regulation ultimately adopted. That is, the magni-
tude of any regulator agency cost problem is in significant part a 
function of the discretion left to the regulators when they mandate 
pay.150 As implementation of any particular debt compensation be-
comes more complicated, regulatory discretion must increase. That 
increase, in turn, will permit regulator agency costs to multiply,     
reducing any benefits achieved by the debt compensation proposals 
and permitting the same pathologies observed in the prudential    
monitoring context.  
 What might the debt compensation proposals look like in practice? 
Proponents are split on the question of ex ante specificity. Tung 
would require little: “Because of each bank’s unique situation and the 
fine judgments required to optimize compensation arrangements, 
strict regulatory mandates seem inadvisable. Generalized mandates 
are likely to offer a poor fit for many banks, and mandates may be 
 149. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 77, at 96-97 (“Ex ante—before a crisis emerg-
es—proponents of enhanced financial oversight confront a formidable asymmetry in politi-
cal power between the financial industry and the general public. Special interests oppose 
meaningful constraints on risk taking, and the general public has neither the means nor 
the interest to compete with them. Only in the wake of a severe economic downturn does 
public discontent tend to translate into regulatory reform.” (footnotes omitted)). On the 
other hand, the particular salience of executive compensation may conceivably steel regu-
lators’ will or cow bank managers. See Joe Nocera, Pay Cuts, but Little Headway on Larger 
Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/10/23/business/23nocera.html (discussing that Kenneth Feinberg “tried hard to bal-
ance the desire among angry taxpayers to see pay curbed at the companies [the govern-
ment] had to save last year”); see also David Ellis, Wall Street Fat Cats Fear the Pay Czar, 
CNNMONEY (Oct. 20, 2009, 2:58 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/20/news/companies/ 
feinberg_compensation/index.htm (noting that Kenneth Feinberg “suggested” that “out-
going Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis . . . not accept a salary or bonus for 2009”); Eamon 
Javers, Feinberg Touts His Special Mastery, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2009, 4:51 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28635.html (stating that Feinberg “rejected the 
initial proposals of every single company involved [in the executive compensation           
process]”).  
 150. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
546 (2000) (“Scholars have expended considerable energy in particular on structuring and 
disciplining the exercise of discretion in order to limit agencies’ freedom ‘to do as they 
please.’ ” (quoting Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 777 (1999))); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: 
Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 436-37 
(1999) (“It is hard to argue against empowering regulators with greater flexibility to better 
serve the purposes underlying regulation. Problems arise, however, when different indi-
viduals characterize the purposes of a regulatory scheme.”); Adam S. Zimmerman, Distrib-
uting Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 557 (2011) (“After all, agencies need discretion to 
determine when to enforce their own regulations.”). 
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difficult to revise in the face of changed circumstances.”151 For Tung, 
a range of bank-specific and manager-specific factors will cause opti-
mal packages to diverge across cases.152 This tracks the point well-
understood in the finance literature that optimal compensation con-
tracts will vary.153  
 Others appear more open to simplifying matters. Bebchuk and 
Spamann’s proposal, along with Krawcheck’s, seem to point in this 
direction, although it is less clear that they do so in order to minimize 
regulator agency costs. Bebchuk and Spamann’s proposal is far more 
detailed and is worth examining further. As noted, they would re-
place the currently equity-heavy banker pay structure with one rep-
resenting a basket of the firm’s securities, including common stock, 
preferred stock, and bonds.154 Nothing in Bebchuk and Spamann’s 
proposal requires that the basket of securities in the manager’s pay 
structure mimic the capital structure of the bank (or bank holding 
company).155 In fact, in a preliminary version of their article, Beb-
chuk and Spamann seemed to concede, pace Tung, that “[o]ptimal 
setting of executive pay arrangements requires substantial infor-
mation,” which makes most sense if the basket approach they advo-
cate permits something more complicated than mere replication of 
the firm’s capital structure.156 Nevertheless, the few responses to 
Bebchuk and Spamann’s proposal that have been written have char-
acterized it as a “slice of the capital structure” approach,157 and they 
at least appear not to have disavowed that characterization.158 
 The noteworthy characteristic of such an approach is that it is 
likely to lower regulator agency costs. There would be a compensa-
tion “rule” to be applied mechanically. This “rule” would leave little 
 151. Tung, supra note 4, at 1249; cf. Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 92 (“[T]he manag-
er’s debt-to-equity ratio is increasing in his effect on the liquidation value and the probabil-
ity of bankruptcy, and decreasing in growth opportunities.”).  
 152. Tung, supra note 4, at 1248. Tung suggests the following factors from the inside 
debt literature: leverage, capital structure, corporate structure, investment opportunities, 
ownership structure, default risk, and managers’ personal portfolio characteristics. Id. at 
1248 n.210 (collecting authorities).  
 153. E.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal 
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 151, 152 (1999). 
 154. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 283-85. The authors recognize the distor-
tive effect of implicit government guaranties on bank securities prices and suggest account-
ing for potential bailouts by subtracting their value from the firm value referent. See id. at 
284. 
 155. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 156. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay 45 (Harvard 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 641, 2009).  
 157. Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 64; Tung, supra note 4, at 1244; Gordon, supra note 
4, at 9. 
 158. Krawcheck’s advocacy of this aping approach is more explicit. Krawcheck, supra 
note 4, at 109 (“Any shift in this direction would have an impact, but the most logical end 
point would be a compensation mix that mirrors the bank’s capital structure.”). 
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room for shirking by regulators and would seem to make forbearance 
harder to come by for banks and managers. It is true that there 
might be complicated questions about characterizing or replicating 
certain securities in the capital structure,159 and that the rigidity of 
the rule may encourage bank managers to opt for inefficient struc-
tures,160 but with some trial and error, mimicry may be readily 
achievable. What we gain by thinking in these terms is a plausible 
case in which regulating via pay dominates traditional bank monitor-
ing by significantly reducing regulator agency costs. 
 Two concerns immediately arise, however. First, as already noted, 
one-size-fits-all guidelines will often be imperfectly calibrated in any 
given case.161 The question of discretion trades off efficient tailoring 
of compensation contracts against regulator agency costs. Taking the 
Bebchuk, Spamann, and Krawcheck approach, for example, it is hard 
to imagine how a simple “pay by the slice” approach would appropri-
ately structure optimal risk-taking incentives at many firms,162 even 
assuming a high level of sensitivity on the part of bank managers.163 
Managers’ existing portfolio holdings will vary considerably, particu-
larly so at the moment of pay regulation’s implementation, but also 
for any internal hires who accumulated debt (such as deferred com-
pensation or a pension) or equity (shares or stock options) holdings at 
an earlier career stage. Moreover, managers’ background levels of 
wealth, career horizons, and risk aversion are bound to be heteroge-
neous, making a capital-structure-mimicking approach rough justice 
at best.164 
 Further, if we allow regulation by pay through operation of a sim-
ple rule notwithstanding these potential inefficiencies, it raises the 
question of whether traditional prudential regulation should be enti-
tled to the same generosity. For example, if we are willing to settle 
for rough justice regarding capital adequacy and accept that the rules 
might be suboptimal as applied to many firms, some of the argu-
ments against enhanced requirements under Basel III begin to fall 
 159. Gordon, supra note 4, at 9-10. The Internal Revenue Code may also pose problems 
as more exotic instruments are used. See 26 U.S.C. § 409A (2012) (requiring certain types 
of nonqualified deferred compensation to be included in gross income). 
 160. Gordon, supra note 4, at 10. 
 161. See Tung, supra note 4, at 1245.  
 162. See id. (“Because bank managers’ individual situations will vary in ways that are 
not correlated with their BHCs’ capital structures, there is no conceptual basis for assum-
ing that executive pay in the form of a representative slice of the BHC’s securities will offer 
appropriate incentives to internalize risk at the banking subsidiary.”). 
 163. For reasons to think that pay incentives might be drowned out anyway, see supra 
Part III (competing labor market incentives), and supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text 
(describing Alces and Galle’s behavioral psychology claim). 
 164. For more on the intensely idiosyncratic nature of optimal compensation design, 
see Lund & Polsky, supra note 6, at 711-15. 
                                                                                                                  
638  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:609 
 
away.165 To be sure, questions would remain concerning the effect of 
particular capital levels and their relationship to liquidity in the 
economy,166 among other things. But the heterogeneity of optimal 
capital requirements across firms would become less important as 
monitoring and compliance costs were discounted.167 Similarly, if 
regulators are permitted to adopt a rough version of the Volcker Rule 
so as to prevent potential regulatory capture, the arguments against 
such a rule become more limited.168  
 Granting all of that, one-size-fits-all compensation structures 
might impose a different level of social costs than one-size-fits-all 
prudential monitoring rules. Regulation by pay with low regulatory 
discretion, like other pricing mechanisms, may prove information-
forcing and therefore preferable to command-style direct regulation. 
It is at this point that the arguments about debt compensation’s inef-
fectiveness discussed in Part III reappear, however. 
V.   THE DANGER OF REGULATING BY PAY 
 Nevertheless, a proponent is entitled to point out that any incen-
tive shifts occasioned by compensation tinkering, however weak, 
would be better than nothing. After all, it is hard to see what harm 
increasing the level of bank debt held by managers might cause. In 
fact, Tung,169 along with Bebchuk and Spamann,170 make this very 
point near the end of their proposals.171  
 165. For more on the critiques of capital requirement rigidity, see Admati et al., supra 
note 27; see also infra note 176. 
 166. Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements, 55 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 298, 299 (2008) (“[C]apital adequacy regulation can impose an important 
cost because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity by accepting deposits.”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 25, at 67-68 (“Affected industry members contend 
that zealous enforcement of the proprietary trading ban, which could restrict other bank 
principal positions, would impair customer service, market liquidity, and other beneficial 
functions performed by many banking entities. . . . Balancing these competing concerns 
and implementing workable and enforceable definitions of permitted and prohibited activi-
ty falls to the five federal agencies charged with Volcker Rule implementation.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 169. Tung, supra note 4, at 1250-51. 
 170. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 285 (“However, that executives may 
have other sources of incentives to take excessive risks to benefit common shareholders 
hardly implies that it would be undesirable to place limits on the extent to which pay ar-
rangements provide executives with such incentives; such limits would at least move us in 
the right direction.”). 
 171. Krawcheck does not and, as will be discussed later, appears to assume significant 
effectiveness on the part of pay regulation. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. 
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A.   Compensation Costs 
 This modest formulation is actually more supportable in the case 
of shifting toward debt compensation than it was when pay shifted 
toward levels of equity beginning in the 1980s.172 Absent incentive 
effects, it is well-understood that substituting fixed pay for equity is 
an inefficient way to compensate managers, primarily because the 
riskiness of equity pay inclines managers to require a premium be-
yond their reservation wage in order to bear the new risk.173 Moreo-
ver, there is a well-developed view that equity-heavy packages, par-
ticularly when options did not have to be expensed, were misper-
ceived by boards as being cheap forms of compensation.174  
 Substituting debt for equity, on the other hand, generally lowers 
the risk borne by managers and should, therefore, lower the premium 
they require to accept a given pay structure. At the very least, a shift 
toward greater debt compensation should not entitle bank managers 
to extract an additional risk premium beyond the one they currently 
obtain. Moreover, there is likely little confusion in a director’s mind 
regarding debt’s effect on a bank’s balance sheet. Accordingly, tinker-
ing with compensation in this way should not cause compensation 
costs at banks to explode.175 
 Two caveats to this happy state of affairs are in order, however. 
First, this assumes that a shift to increase the proportion of inside 
debt is not effected by simply adding incremental debt onto existing 
pay packages, as might be the case under circumstances of signifi-
cant managerial power. Second, this also assumes that, even in a 
world of static total compensation, the increased debt payments come 
at the expense of equity pay rather than salary or perquisites. Inside 
debt, while less risky than equity, will nevertheless be riskier than 
salary and perks, which may cause managers to charge a risk premi-
um for the substitution. Should either of these assumptions fail, debt 
compensation proposals would become more problematic.  
 172. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
 173. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 16 (2002) (“[T]he economic cost to shareholders of granting options often 
far exceeds the value that employee-recipients place on the option.”).  
 174. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Pow-
er Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002). 
 175. See Edmans & Liu, supra note 4, at 77 (“Even in situations where bonuses can 
attenuate risk-shifting, inside debt can be a cheaper solution since its sensitivity to liqui-
dation values renders it a more powerful instrument.”). However, the switch to debt com-
pensation may increase transaction costs. See Alces & Galle, supra note 6, at 71-72. This, 
along with concerns about regulator agency costs, may counsel in favor of a rough, pay-by-
the-slice approach. 
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B.   Perceived Substitution Effects 
 In any event, the move to debt compensation might cause other 
problems. For instance, such a shift could lead to a concomitant re-
laxation of prudential monitoring by regulators. If increased debt 
compensation would reduce regulatory vigilance in other ways, there 
could be a social loss to the extent the shift to debt compensation 
promised more than it delivered regarding manager behavior as     
discussed above.  
 This concern is hardly fanciful in regard to Krawcheck’s proposal. 
Prior to suggesting a pay-by-the-slice approach (as well as a new div-
idend policy and a reduction in the role of net interest income in per-
formance evaluation), Krawcheck claims that traditional prudential 
monitoring via capital requirements is problematic.176 Her debt com-
pensation proposal is explicitly envisioned as a substitute for that 
sort of monitoring: “So [an enhanced capital requirement] clearly 
isn’t the answer. Boards need simple and commonsense—but power-
ful—tools to cut through the complexity and push management be-
havior in the direction of responsible risk taking.”177 
 Krawcheck’s article is the extreme example of substituting regula-
tion by pay in place of prudential monitoring, but the idea finds its 
way into even more sober debt compensation proposals. Bebchuk, 
Spamann, and Tung are careful not to eschew traditional monitoring 
mechanisms.178 Nevertheless, even they suggest that pay regulation 
might partially substitute for prudential monitoring.179 For example, 
Bebchuk and Spamann suggest:  
 176. See Krawcheck, supra note 4, at 108 (“The main tool with which boards and regu-
lators have managed risk at banks in recent decades is the capital ratio. The logic is that 
the higher the capital ratio—that is, the more money set aside against potential losses—
the lower the risk. This is simple enough in theory but wildly complicated and confusing in 
practice. It’s not at all clear what the right amount of capital is; in fact, it’s not even clear 
how capital should be measured. At any given board meeting, bank directors will hear 
about GAAP capital, capital as measured under the current Basel regime (international 
standards set by bank regulators), capital as measured under the coming Basel regime, 
and the bank’s own view of the right amount of capital, often called economic capital. With-
in these categories are various subcategories, including Tier 1 capital, tangible capital, and 
total capital. These capital measures often fail to keep up with market events. Also, the 
calculations can be shaped by banks’ own assessments of risk, regulators’ assessments of 
banks’ risk models, and ratings from rating agencies—all of which are subject to underly-
ing biases, to put it mildly.”).  
 177. Id. 
 178. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 278 (“We highlight the limitations of [pru-
dential monitoring], and show that it can be usefully complemented by regulating the in-
centives of those making the choices from the menu.” (emphasis added)); Tung, supra note 
4, at 1209 (“Requiring bankers to hold their own banks’ debt would not substitute for tradi-
tional external regulation but would offer an important supplement to the existing regula-
tory toolkit for constraining bank risk taking.”). 
 179. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 253-54 (“Regulating bankers’ pay could 
nicely supplement and reinforce the traditional, direct regulation of banks’ activities. In-
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[W]hen bank regulators ensure or at least verify that compensa-
tion structures do not provide strong incentives to take risks, 
banks can be given more discretion to make choices. We do not be-
lieve that regulating executives’ incentives alone would be suffi-
cient to ensure the soundness of financial institutions and would 
not obviate the need for substantial direct regulation of banks’ ac-
tions. But, we do believe that, with experience, banking regulators 
may sometimes be able to reduce traditional regulation of the menu 
of actions when bank executives’ incentives are more in line with the 
regulation’s goals.180   
The qualifications in that prescription—regulators’ ability to “ensure” 
or “verify” the impact of compensation structures and an incremental 
approach based on “experience” going forward181—are surely appro-
priate. However, whether they offer much comfort is another ques-
tion. Note that the relative weights to place on regulation by pay and 
more traditional tools are to be determined by regulators, the same 
regulators whose poor performance is driving the regulation-via-pay 
project in the first place. If regulatory agency costs are significant, it 
is hard to imagine why anyone should expect regulators to strike the 
optimal balance among these various tools. If their natural inclina-
tion tends toward forbearance as the premise underlying the project 
suggests, new levels of debt compensation might grease the skids  
toward that result. 
 What is more, evaluation of compensation incentive-shifting abil-
ity is notoriously difficult.182 Many studies have purported to demon-
strate a link between compensation-based incentives and firm per-
deed, if pay arrangements are designed to discourage excessive risk-taking, direct regula-
tion of activities could be less tight than it should otherwise be.” (emphasis added)); Tung, 
supra note 4, at 1247 (“For example, better prudential incentives in executive pay ar-
rangements may justify . . . less stringent capital requirements, or less burdensome report-
ing requirements or on-site examinations for a given bank.” (emphasis added)). Tung makes 
the point even more explicitly in a subsequent paper. Tung & Wang, supra note 113, at 4 
(“Not only may banking regulation offer a substitute for corporate governance, as some 
believe; we offer the first evidence that governance—in the form of bank CEO compensa-
tion structure—may substitute for banking regulation, as a number of commentators have 
recently proposed.” (emphasis added)). 
 180. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 4, at 286 (emphasis added). 
 181. Tung also suggests that the exact contours of pay regulation and its substitution 
for prudential monitoring “will need to be worked out through practical experience.” Tung, 
supra note 4, at 1251. 
 182. Igor Filatotchev & Deborah Allcock, Corporate Governance and Executive Remu-
neration: A Contingency Framework, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2010, at 20, 21 (“Despite 
considerable research effort, the empirical findings on these causal linkages [between com-
pensation-based incentives and firm performance] have been mixed and inconclusive. For 
example, empirical studies and meta-analyses of the effects of executive equity-related 
incentives on financial performance have failed to identify consistently significant        
effects.”). 
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formance.183 Yet the majority of those studies covered earlier periods 
when the vigorous alternative mechanisms described above were not 
nearly as strong. We have little evidence of the leverage that pay 
tweaking provides in today’s corporate governance environment. 
More importantly, it is near impossible to infer causation in those 
studies. Compensation structure is as likely to be an endogenous 
output, given a firm’s characteristics, as it is to be an exogenous in-
put.184 Even those who otherwise approve of a robust incentive-pay 
regime sound a cautious note with regard to the evidence of its actual 
effects.185 However, despite all of this qualification, there is no doubt 
that the vast majority of law and finance scholars, to say nothing     
of other corporate governance activists, subscribe to some version     
of the view that compensation structure materially moves firm per-
formance. It seems safe to presume that a similar faith might be 
shown by regulators when evaluating the efficacy of any new debt 
compensation incentives. 
 Adverting to regulation by pay, then, is apt to do more than serve 
as a belts-and-suspenders addition to the regulatory arsenal. Given 
(1) the potential for regulator agency costs in determining the bal-
ance between regulation by pay and traditional prudential monitor-
ing, and (2) the unhappy experience with evaluating the impact of 
pay design on incentives, there is a good possibility that the inclusion 
of regulation by pay will actually lower overall regulation of banks, in 
direct tension with the reformers’ goals.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 There is great reason to expect little from adding debt compensa-
tion to the pay packages of bank managers and little reason to expect 
very much. Any new debt incentives are liable to be overwhelmed by 
 183. See Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation 23-25 (Rock Ctr. for Cor-
porate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 77, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582232 (offering a sample of such 
studies). 
 184. Id. at 23 (studies could indicate “compensation affects performance, because firm 
performance affects pay, or because an unobserved firm or CEO characteristic affects both 
variables”); Dennis Wright Michaud & Yunwei Gai, CEO Compensation and Firm Perfor-
mance 1-2 (Dec. 20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531673 (finding that only cash bonuses were correlated with 
improved firm performances and that even that relationship is vulnerable to endogeneity 
concerns, i.e., compensation “was simultaneously determined with performance”). 
 185. See Murphy, supra note 37, at 2539 (“Unfortunately, although there is a plethora 
of evidence on dysfunctional consequences of poorly designed pay programs, there is sur-
prisingly little direct evidence that higher pay-performance sensitivities lead to higher 
stock-price performance.”); Core et al., supra note 9, at 34 (describing conflicting studies 
regarding the relationship between equity compensation and firm performance while not-
ing “[t]here is presently no theoretical or empirical consensus on how stock options and 
managerial equity ownership affect firm performance”).  
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even middling career concerns on the part of the managers. And, the 
best version of pay tinkering vis-à-vis traditional prudential bank 
monitoring appears to be one that is bound to be suboptimal at many 
firms. What is more, a range of other criticisms might be reasonably 
leveled at the recent proposals, some more persuasive than others. 
 Still, there is something to be said for experimentation in light of 
apparently ineffective prudential monitoring mechanisms. As confi-
dence in capital requirements or bank monitors wanes, it is natural 
to search for alternatives. But there is a real chance that adding debt 
to bankers’ pay, even cautiously, will exacerbate those problems with 
traditional bank regulation. To the extent errors have been made in 
evaluating incentive pay’s effects before, the downside was simply 
excessive compensation costs at individual firms and perhaps some 
increase in income inequality across society without an equivalent 
gain in firm performance. Getting pay’s effects wrong in the bank 
regulatory context is more troubling, given our hard-earned under-
standing of the downsides of excessive bank risk. If regulators were 
more vigilant, that might be a risk worth taking, but if they were, we 
would not need bank regulation via pay in the first place. 
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